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Recent advances in monetary theory incorporate some decentralized and some cen-
tralized trade. These models have an essential role for money and also allow one to
easily add key ingredients from more standard macro models. However, existing pa-
pers consider only cases that dichotomize: allocations in centralized and decentralized
markets are independent, which implies monetary policy has no e⁄ect on consumption,
investment, employment, or output in the centralized market. We analyze natural gen-
eralizations of the model without this special property, and hence with more interesting
positive and normative policy implications. We also compare di⁄erent mechanisms for
monetary exchange, including bargaining and competitive markets.
11 Introduction
We believe that much progress has been made over the last 15 years or so in modeling explic-
itly the microfoundations of monetary exchange. There is now a large literature analyzing
models that go beyond previously prominent reduced-form approaches, such as imposing a
cash-in-advance constraint, which says people simply ￿have to￿use money to acquire certain
goods, or sticking money into preferences or technology, which says people are ￿happier or
more e¢ cient￿when they use money. A representative paper in the microfoundations lit-
erature provides details about the underlying environment ￿preferences (over consumption
goods, not assets), technology, the pattern of meetings, information, and so on ￿that give
rise to outcomes where agents may choose endogenously to use certain objects as media of
exchange, and attempts to derive conditions under which certain institutions, like monetary
exchange per se or certain monetary policies, lead to higher output and welfare. Modeling
explicitly the frictions in a model that can make money essential seems like progress.
It is still the case, however, that many mainstream macroeconomists continue to use
the reduced-form approach. This was clearly understandable in the early days of the mi-
crofoundations literature, for a variety of reasons ￿not least of which was that papers in
this literature needed (or at least used) some very strong assumptions about things like
the amount of money and goods agents were allowed to inventory, and also because they
were so focused on the process of exchange they abstracted from many of the ingredients
that more standard macro models routinely incorporate, like physical capital, labor markets,
competitive ￿rms, trends or shocks in productivity, etc. These features looked not only un-
conventional and perhaps aesthetically unpleasing to some economists, but more importantly
they seemed to preclude analyses of many macroeconomic issues, including monetary policy
as it is usually conceived.1
1As Azariadis (1993) describes the situation, ￿Capturing the transactions motive for holding money
balances in a compact and logically appealing manner has turned out to be an enormously complicated
task. Logically coherent models such as those proposed by Diamond (1982) and Kiyotaki and Wright (1989)
tend to be so removed from neoclassical growth theory as to seriously hinder the job of integrating rigorous
monetary theory with the rest of macroeconomics.￿And as Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) more recently put it,
￿The matching models are without doubt ingenious and beautiful. But it is quite hard to integrate them with
2More recent work in monetary theory has gone some way towards reducing the distance
between monetary models with microfoundations and mainstream macro. Examples include
the models in Shi (1997) and Lagos and Wright (2003) that do away with the arti￿cial
restrictions on inventories in the earlier models, with a minimum loss (perhaps a gain) in
tractability. Some details in these two models di⁄er a lot ￿in particular, Shi assumes that
the fundamental decision-making unit is a family with a continuum of members that provide
intrahousehold insurance against the luck of the trading process, which by the law of large
numbers implies the useful result that every household of the same type starts each trading
round with the same real balances, while Lagos and Wright assume individuals have periodic
access to centralized markets, which by the assumption of quasi-linear utility delivers the
same result. But either approach allows us to much more easily analyze standard questions
concerning, say, optimal monetary policy and the welfare cost of in￿ ation.
Still, the base-line models in Shi (1997) and Lagos and Wright (2003) do not look much
like mainstream macro, as represented by, e.g., the neoclassical growth model and its many
applications to business cycles, public ￿nance, development, and so on. One reason is that
those models use a very di⁄erent price-determination mechanism: since the literature on the
microfoundations of money has long been based on the notion that bilateral (or at least
relativey small group) trade is a key element contributing to the essentiality of a medium
of exchange, rather than competitive Walrasian pricing, this literature adopted one of the
mechanisms commonly used in search-theory, usually bargaining or price posting. Another
reason is that those models are still missing some of the staple ingredients in standard macro
models, including labor markets, capital investment, etc. So while these newer models do
allow us to address some more conventional issues, they are still pretty far removed from the
mainstream, and hence most practitioners continue to ply the reduced-form approach.
The goal of this project is to continue the integratation of monetary theory with main-
stream macro, in two ways. First, following up on a line in Rocheteau and Wright (2003),
we explore the implications of using competitive pricing rather than, say, bargaining in the
Lagos-Wright model, not only in the centralized market but in all markets. This allows one
the rest of macroeconomic theory ￿not least because they jettison the basic tool of our trade, competitive
markets.￿
3to disentangle which results come from explicitly incorporating frictions into the physical
environment (e.g. from assumptions on specialization, information, etc.) and which come
from imposing a particular non-competitive price-determination mechanism. Moreover, it
turns out that using competitive pricing dramatically simpli￿es the workings of the model,
and this allows us to pursue our second line ￿which is that given the basic Lagos-Wright
structure, one can without much di¢ culty add ￿rms, labor, and capital markets, basically
integrating a prototypical monetary model with the neoclassical growth model.2
This second line was also pursued in Aruoba and Wright (2003), but the results there
are quite special because the way that model was speci￿ed implies a very strong dichotomy:
one can solve independently for the allocations in the centralized and decentralized markets.
This dichotomy result is problematic for several reasons. First, in some sense it means that
the model has really not integreated monetary theory and standard macro at all ￿at best, it
shows that they may under certain assumptions coexist without getting in each other￿ s way.
Second, it has stark policy conclusions: changing monetary policy a⁄ects prices and quantities
in the decentralzied market, but has no impact on any variable in the centralized market.
In particular, aggregate employment and investment are independent of money. We show
here that the dichotomy is not general: small and natural changes in the speci￿cation lead to
versions of the model with rich feedback between the centralized and decentralized markets,
and hence where monetary policy has interesting implications for aggregate consumption,
employment and investment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the basic model
and derive the equilibrium under two di⁄erent pricing structures: bilateral bargaining and
competitive pricing. Optimal monetary policy is discussed as is the impact of changes in
the money growth rate on consumption, investment and output. Section 3 extends the basic
model by introducing market speci￿c capital and by changing the production technology of
capital. Section 4 outlines our calibrtion and Section 5 presents our welfare results. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.
2It is also possible to add capital to the basic Shi model, as in Shi (1999) or Faig (2001), e.g., but it seems
to us slightly easier and perhaps more natural to do so in the Lagos-Wright version because the centralized
markets are already up and running.
42 The Basic Model
The environment is similar in spirit to the framework introduced in Lagos and Wright (2003)
￿hereafter denoted LW. There is a [0;1] continuum of in￿nite-lived agents. Time is discrete,
and each period is divided into two subperiods called day and night. The di⁄erences between
these subperiods is as follows. First, at night agents trade in frictionless markets, while by
contrast during the day trade occurs in markets with various degrees of frictions, depending
on the version of the model. One friction that is present in all versions is a double coincidence
problem, generated here by taste and technology shocks. Another such friction is that agents
are assumed to be anonymous in day markets, which precludes standard credit arrangements,
because they cannot be enforced (Kocherlakota 1998; Wallace 2001). These two frictions
make money essential. Additionally, while the night market is always perfectly competitive,
we will consider two alternative mechanisms for the day market: competitive price taking,
and bilateral bargaining.
At night goods can be either consumed or invested as capital, and productive capital
and labor services are rented to ￿rms in competitive markets. During the day labor is not
traded in the market, because the technology used by ￿rms at night does not operate during
the day; however, agents￿own labor e⁄ort e may be used as an input into an individual
technology in the day market. In the base model capital is also not traded in the day market
(but it is in one extension considered below). The assumption is that once put in place
capital cannot be physically moved to the location where the day market meets. Although
capital is not physically present, agents individual technologies for producing during the day
still depend in general on k.3 We write q = f(k;e) for the individual technology during the
day, and Q = F(K;H) for the production function operated by ￿rms at night.
To generate a double coincidence problem we adopt the following speci￿cation for tastes
3As an example of capital that enters the production function even though it is physically not present
and hence not tradable at a given location, think about logging on to your computer from a remote site. The
only reason for making capital immobile here is to preclude it from serving as a medium of exchange in the
day market; an even simpler alternative would be to interpret k as human capital, but this would obviously
change the empirical implications. See Waller (2004) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2002) for models in which
capital can be used as money.
5and technology during the day: for each agent, with probability ￿ he wants to consume
but cannot produce, with probability ￿ he can produce but does not want to consume,
and with probability 1 ￿ 2￿ he can neither produce nor consume. This is equivalent for
many purposes to the standard speci￿cation in the search literature of random bilateral
matching, where there is a probability ￿ of wanting to consume a good produced by a
random partner. We frame things here in terms of random tastes and technology rather
than random matching simply because it helps some of the discussion to follow, especially
the comparison across the di⁄erent pricing mechanisms. In any case, due to the double
coincidence problem and anonymity, money is essential.4 The supply of money is M and
changes according to M+1 = (1 + ￿)M, where we use a subscript +1 to denote next period.
New money injected via lump sum transfers (or taxes if ￿ < 0) in the night market.
Instantaneous utility at night is U(x)￿Ah where x is consumption, h is labor hours and
A is a constant.. Utility during the day is random: with probability ￿ an agent wants to
consume and has utility u(q) where q is consumption; with probability ￿ an agents is able
to produce and has utility ￿￿(e) where e is labor e⁄ort; and with probability 1 ￿ 2￿ utility
is 0. We assume that U(x), u(q), and ￿(e) have the usual properties. Linearity in h is not
important, in principle, but it does generate a huge gain in tractability: as in LW, it allows
us to derive nice analytical results.5 Separability across (x;q;e) facilitates the presentation
somewhat, but is not otherwise important, as we show in the Appendix. The discount factor
across periods is ￿ 2 (0;1); to reduce notation there is no discounting between subperiods,
but this is easy to relax (see Rocheteau and Wright 2003).
In the analysis below it is convenient to write the agent￿ s disutility of e⁄ort as the utility
cost of producing goods using capital. Let c(q;k) denote the cost in terms of utility from
producing q units of output using k units of capital. The cost function is obtained as follows:
for a given k, solve q = f(e;k) for e =  (q;k) and let c(q;k) = ￿[ (q;k)]. Notice cq > 0,
ck < 0, cqq > 0, and ckk > 0 under the usual monotonicity and convexity assumptions on f
4We mean essential in the technical sense, that (desirable) allocations can be achieved with money that
cannot be achieved without money, subject to the relevant resource and incentive feasibility conditions (again
see Kocherlakota 1998 or Wallace 2001).
5Rogerson (1988) shows that having utility linear in h is equivalent having general preferences, indivisible
labor, and employment lotteries; the same is true here.
6and ￿, and have cqk < 0 under the additional restriction fefk￿00 > ￿0 (fkfee ￿ fefek), which
always holds in the case where k is a normal input, including the case fke > 0.6
We analyze the model by ￿rst considering the night market and then the day market.
At night, if r is the rental rate on capital and w the real wage, pro￿t maximization implies
r = FK(K;H) and w = FH(K;H), and constant returns implies equilibrium pro￿ts are zero.
Normalize the price of the capital/consumption good to 1 and let ￿ be the relative price of
money. Let W(m;k) and V (m;k) denote the value functions of agents entering the night
market and day market, respectively, with money and capital (m;k). Then the problem of
an agent in the night market is
W(m;k) = max
x;h;m+1;k+1
U(x) ￿ Ah + ￿V (m+1;k+1)
s:t: x = rk + wh + ￿(m + ￿M ￿ m+1) + (1 ￿ ￿)k ￿ k+1;
where ￿ is the depreciation rate, (m+1;k+1) is the money and capital taken out of the market,











(x + ￿m+1 + k+1) + ￿V (m+1;k+1)
￿
:
6Given q = f(k;e) implies e =  (q;k), @e=@q =  q = 1=fe > 0 and @e=@k =  k =
￿fk=fe < 0. Also,  qq = ￿fee=f3
e > 0,  kk = ￿1
￿
f2
efkk ￿ 2fefk + f2
kfee
￿
=fe > 0, and  kq =












e > 0 and ckq = [￿fefk￿00 + ￿0 (fkfee ￿ fefek)]=fe. Say-
ing k is normal means that in the problem minwe + rk s:t: f(k;e) ￿ q, the solution satis￿es @k=@q =
￿(fkfee ￿ fefek) > 0.



















A(r + 1 ￿ ￿)
w
: (3)
Moreover, it should be clear from the above that the choice of (m+1;k+1) is independent
of (m;k), and this makes the distribution of money and capital holdings degenerate in
equilibrium. Intuitively, the linearity of utility in h in an LW environment eliminates wealth
e⁄ects, and this makes all agents choose the same (m+1;k+1) regardless of (m;k).8 While
models with nondegenerate distributions are worth studying, for some questions it seems
reasonable to abstract from distributional issues and study representative agent models ￿rst.
This is what we get from the linearity of utility in h.
We now proceed to the day market. The value function is
V (m;k) = ￿Vb(m;k) + ￿Vs(m;k) + (1 ￿ 2￿)W(m;k) (4)
7The second order conditions are complicated, and generally ambiguous, since they involve second deriva-
tives of V which can involve third derivatives of u and c, at least under the bargaining mechanism. Following
the methods in LW, one can show that V is concave if the bargaining power parameter ￿ is close to 1, or if
we impose additional conditions on preferences and technology (in LW c was normalized to be linear and u0
was assumed log concave). We avoid these details and simply assume V is concave in the bargaining model,
but again this is always true for ￿ close to 1.
8Actually, in addition to linearity in h, we also require V strictly concave and an interior solution; see LW
for technical assumptions to guarantee these results. The assumptions needed for interiority involve initial
conditions: if (m;k) is very disperse across people, then the rich remain rich and the poor remain poor
for several periods; if we start with (m;k) not too disperse, however, we converge quickly to a degenerate
distribution and stay there.
8where
Vb(m;k) = u(qb) + W(m ￿ db;k)
Vs(m;k) = ￿c(qs;k) + W(m + ds;k)
are the value functions when one is a buyer and seller, respectively, and qb and db are the
amounts of output and money agents expect to exchange when buying, and qs and ds are the
amounts when selling, to be determined below.9 Using the result in (2) that Wm = A￿=w,
we have




























































A(r + 1 ￿ ￿)
w
: (6)
It remains to specify how prices are determined in the day market, so that we can substitute
for the derivatives in the above expressions. This will di⁄er across the two versions of the
model presented below.
Before pursuing equilibrium, however, as a benchmark we begin with the planner￿ s prob-
lem, unconstrained by the assumption that agents are anonymous, so that we can simply




U(x) ￿ Ah + ￿u(q) ￿ ￿c(q;k) + ￿J(k+1) (7)
s:t: x = F(k;h) + (1 ￿ ￿)k ￿ k+1
Substituting for x and di⁄erentiating, the ￿rst order conditions are
h : A = U0(x)Fh(k;h)
k+1 : U0(x) = ￿J0(k+1)
q : u0(q) = cq(q;k)
(8)
9It should be clear how exactly the same equation would emerge from a random matching model (see
LW, for example).
9The envelope condition is
J
0(k) = U
0(x)[Fk(k;h) + 1 ￿ ￿] ￿ ￿ck(q;k);
and the Euler equation is
U
0(x) = ￿U
0(x+1)[Fk(k+1;h+1) + 1 ￿ ￿] ￿ ￿￿ck(q+1;k+1) (9)
It is clear that the solution has q = q￿(k) where q￿(k) satis￿es u0(q) = cq(q;k). Given this,
the other control variables (k+1;h;x) satisfy relatively standard conditions, the ￿rst equation
in (8), (9), and the constraint in (7).
2.1 Equilibrium I: Bargaining
Here we consider a mechanism used in much recent work in monetary theory, where agents
bargain bilaterally. While the results are more complicated under bargaining than the com-
petitive mechanism presented below, bargaining is arguably a very natural solution concept
in models with frictions, and also serves to highlight certain e⁄ects that the competitive
mechanism masks. Thus, here each agent with a desire to consume is matched with one who
can produce. Since they - in particular, the buyers - are anonymous, trade must be quid
pro quo meaning they must pay with cash. The buyer transfers d dollars to the seller in
exchange for q units of output, where (q;d) are determined via the generalized Nash solution
with the bargaining power of the buyer denoted ￿ and threat points given by continuation
values. In general, (q;d) depends on the assets of buyer and seller, (mb;kb) and (ms;ks).10
There are two obvious feasibility conditions for the exchange: q cannot exceed the output of
the seller, q ￿ f(e;ks), and d cannot exceed the money holdings of the buyer, d ￿ mb.
The buyer￿ s payo⁄from the trade is u(q)+W(mb￿d;kb) and his threat point W(mb;kb).
Thus, his surplus is
Sb = u(q) + W(mb ￿ d;kb) ￿ W(mb;kb)
= u(q) ￿ d￿A=w;
10Note that while all agents have the same (m;k) in equilibrium, we still need to ask what happens if a
given individual deviates o⁄ the equilibrium path.
10by virtue of (2). The seller￿ s payo⁄is ￿c(q;ks)+W(ms+d;ks) and his threat point W(ms;ks).
Thus his surplus is
Ss = ￿c(q;ks) + W(ms + d;ks) ￿ W(ms;ks)
= ￿c(q;ks) + d￿A=w:







s s.t. d ￿ mb:
As in LW, one can show that in equilibrium with ks = K for all agents the constraint holds
with equality, d = mb. Also as in LW, this further implies q ￿ q￿(ks) where q￿(ks) is the
solution to u0(q) = cq(q;ks), typically with strict inequality q < q￿(ks) (here the inequality
is strict unless ￿ = 1 and we follow the optimal monetary policy). To solve the bargaining
problem, insert d = mb and take the ￿rst order condition with respect to q to get
￿Ssu
0(q) = (1 ￿ ￿)Sbcq(q;ks):
Then insert Sb and Ss and rearrange as ￿mb = g(q;ks)w=A, where
g(q;ks) ￿
￿c(q;ks)u0(q) + (1 ￿ ￿)u(q)cq(q;ks)
￿u0(q) + (1 ￿ ￿)cq(q;ks)
: (10)
Hence, q = q(mb;ks), where the function q(mb;ks) is given by the solution to A￿mb=w =
g(q;ks) (the dependence on prices w and ￿ as well as the parameter A is implicit). This
implies the key derivatives we need in (5) and (6) are given by @q=@mb = A￿=wgq > 0 and
@q=@ks = ￿gk=gq > 0, where
gq =
cqu0[￿u0 + (1 ￿ ￿)cq] + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[u ￿ c][u0cqq ￿ cqu00]
[￿u0 + (1 ￿ ￿)cq]2 > 0 (11)
gk = ￿
cku0 [￿u0 + (1 ￿ ￿)cq] + cqk(1 ￿ ￿)u0 (u ￿ c)
[￿u0 + (1 ￿ ￿)cq]
2 < 0 (12)
(we also have @q=@ms = @q=@kb = 0, @db=@mb = 1, and @ds=@mb = @db=@ks = @ds=@ks = 0).
Thus, if the buyer brings more cash or the seller brings more capital to a meeting, more output
gets traded. Notice that in general the price is non-linear: if the buyer brings half as much
money, he does not get half as much q: For ￿ = 1, g(q;ks) = c(q;ks), which makes things a
11lot simpler: gq = cq and gk = ck, and so therefore @q=@mb = A￿=wcq and @q=@k = ￿ck=cq.
In this case, if marginal cost cq is constant, pricing is linear: if you spend another dollar you
get another unit of q.11













gq(q;K) < 0. Substituting these into the ￿rst order con-
ditions for m+1 and k+1 in (1), and inserting the equilibrium prices ￿ = g(q;ks)w=MA,














0(x+1)[FK(K+1;H+1) + 1 ￿ ￿] ￿ ￿￿￿(q+1;K+1): (14)
The other equilibrium conditions come from the ￿rst order condition for x in (1) and the
resource constraint on total output
A = U
0(x)FH(K;H) (15)
x = F(K;H) + (1 ￿ ￿)K ￿ K+1: (16)
A monetary equilibrium is de￿ned as (positive, bounded) paths for (q;K+1;H;x) satis-
fying (13)-(16), given the initial K0. A nonmonetary equilibrium also always exists, which
satis￿es q = 0 instead of (13), (14) with ￿(￿) = 0, and (15)-(16), which are simply the
equilibrium conditions for the standard nonmonetary growth model (with h entering utility
linearly). Returning to monetary equilibria, consider the case where M+1 = (1 + ￿)M with
￿ constant, so that it makes sense to focus on a steady state, de￿ned as a constant solution
(q;K;H;x) to (13)-(16). De￿ning the rate of time preference ￿ and the nominal interest rate
i such that ￿ = 1
1+￿ and 1 + i = (1 + ￿)(1 + ￿), we can simplify the steady state conditions
11We can also simplify the bargaining solution by setting ￿ = 0, but then mb = 0 and the monetary
equilibrium breaks down. The reason ￿ = 1 does not symmetrically imply ks = 0 is that the same capital is















x = F(K;H) ￿ ￿K: (20)
First, one simple special case of our model is the speci￿cation in Aruoba and Wright
(2003), where capital does not enter the daytime technology, c(q;K) = c(q). In this case













0(x+1)[FK(K+1;H+1) + 1 ￿ ￿]
A = U
0(x)FH(K;H)
x = F(K;H) + (1 ￿ ￿)K ￿ K+1:
This model displays a strong dichotomy: the ￿rst equation determines the path for q and
the other three determine the paths for (K+1;H;x) independently. An implication of this
feature is that M, which enters only the ￿rst equation, a⁄ects q but not (K+1;H;x); that is,
investment, employment and consumption in the night market is independent of monetary
policy.
Of course this does not mean policy is super neutral in Aruoba and Wright (2003): the








>From this it follows that @q=@i < 0 as long as the steady state q is unique (which is
true under certain conditions addressed in LW). Moreover, we know that q < q￿ in any
equilibrium, where q￿ is the e¢ cient quantity de￿ned by u0(q￿) = c0(q￿). Hence, we maximize
welfare by making i as small as is consistent with equilibrium. This turns out to be the
12This expression for i satis￿es the Fisher equation, which eliminates arbitrage opportunities from holding
nominal versus real assets.
13Friedman Rule, i = 0; which requires the money growth rate ￿F to satisfy (1+￿F)(1+￿) = 1
(for any ￿ < ￿F equilibrium does not exist; see LW). Hence, the optimal policy is ￿ = ￿F
and it implies u0(q) = g0(q). However, ￿F does not yield the ￿rst best outcome unless ￿ = 1,
since in the case ￿ = 1, g(q) = c(q) and so ￿ = ￿F implies u0(q) = c0(q). When ￿ < 1 the
Friedman Rule corrects the dynamic wedge associated with impatient agents holding non-
interest-bearing money, but monetary policy cannot correct a second distortion identi￿ed in
LW as a hold-up problem in the bargaining game when ￿ < 1.
The dichotomy in Aruoba and Wright is very special, and does not hold in the generaliza-
tion where k enters the cost function since K and q both appear in (13) and (14), and there is
no way to solve independently ￿rst for q and then the other variables. Naturally, the e¢ cient
investment decision not only takes into account the fact that K a⁄ects productivity in the
night technology, but also productivity in the day technology. A change in the growth rate
of M a⁄ects q and this in turn a⁄ects the return to K. Intuitively, an increase in in￿ ation
(nominal interest rates) reduces the return to trading in the day, which a⁄ects the value of
capital in that market and hence investment. But the same capital is used in both day and
night production, and so an increase in in￿ ation a⁄ects productivity and hence employment
and output in the night markets.
However, in the case ￿ = 1, notice that ￿(q;K) = 0. This means that, although the model
is not dichotomous, it is recursive: (14)-(16) can be solved for (x;K+1;H) independently of
q, and the solution is exactly the path from the standard (nonmonetary) model; then, given
the path for capital, (13) determines the path for q. In this case, anything that a⁄ects capital
a⁄ects the value of money, but there is no feedback in the other direction from q to K. For







(anything that increases K raises the value of money). An implication is that monetary policy
a⁄ects q, but not investment, employment or consumption in night markets. Intuitively, what
happens when ￿ = 1 is that sellers get none of the gains from trade, so they realize none of
the cost savings from bringing extra capital into the day market (another holdup problem)
and hence the investment decision is based solely on returns in night production.
14This holdup problem in the demand for capital is general (it does not only apply in the
extreme case ￿ = 1) and will cause K to diverge from its e¢ cient level. This represents an
additional distortion over and above the usual ine¢ ciency that arises when ￿ > ￿F, and the
holdup problem in money demand that arises when ￿ < 1. Normally these holdup problems
are resolved if one sets ￿ correctly (this is the insight of Hosios (1990) and others), but here
it cannot be done: ￿ = 1 is required to resolve the holdup problem in the demand for money,
but this is the worst possible case for the holdup problem in the demand for capital.13 When
capital reduces the cost of producing day goods, this should be taken into account when
investing in K, but whenever ￿ > 0 the investor has to share the cost savings with the buyer
and hence under-invests. There is obviously no way to set ￿ to both 1 and 0 to eliminate
both holdup problems in the bargaining game. In the next section we consider an alternative
pricing mechanism that does.14
2.2 Equilibrium II: Competitive Pricing
The idea of using competitive (Walrasian) price-taking behavior as an alternative to bargain-
ing in search-type monetary models was explored in Rocheteau and Wright (2003). There it
was assumed that agents were randomly allocated trade opportunities in the sense of access
to markets but in these markets, rather than having agents bargain bilaterally, there is an
auctioneer who sets prices to equate supply and demand. It is legitimate to consider this
pricing mechanism and still assume anonymous traders so as to rule out credit and main-
tain an essential role for money.15 In fact, this mechanism can be reinterpreted in terms
of ￿competitive search equilibrium￿￿an equilibrium concept used by others in nonmone-
tary search theory. In Rocheteau and Wright (2003), this mechanism actually dominates
Walrasian pricing due to a ￿search externality￿at the entry decision; since we do not have
an entry decision here the allocations are the same under the two mechanisms - Walrasian
pricing and competitive search - we present things in terms of the simpler story.
13When ￿ = 0, we have ￿(q;K) = ck(q;K), which yields the e¢ cient investment decision, given q but also
yields q = 0:
14In addition to LW, see Rauch (2000), and Camera, Reed and Waller (2003) for discussions of holdup
problems in monetary models.
15See also Levine (19xx), Kocherlakota (2003), and Temzilides (19xx) for related models.
15The value function for the day market before the shocks are realized has the same form
as in (4) except now Vb(m;k) and Vs(m;k) are di⁄erent. The buyer￿ s problem is
Vb(m;k) = max
qb;d
u(qb) + W(m ￿ d;k)
s:t: pqb = d and d ￿ m
and the seller￿ s problem is
Vs(m;k) = max
qs
￿c(qs;k) + W(m + pqs;k):
These are standard competitive demand and supply problems with p taken parametrically.
In equilibrium qb = qs = q because we have conveniently assumed there are the same number
￿ of buyers and sellers.
The buyer￿ s choice satis￿es u0(q) = pWm(M ￿ pq;k) = pA￿=w if the constraint is not
binding and q = M=p if it is, where we have inserted the equilibrium condition m = M, and
Wm = A￿=w (which we can do because the night market here is exactly the same as before).
The seller￿ s choice satis￿es cq(q;k) = pWm(M + pq;k) = pA￿=w. If the buyer￿ s constraint
is not binding, the equilibrium q solves u0(q) = cq(q;k), or q = q￿(k); if the constraint
is binding, the equilibrium solves cq(q;k) = A￿M=wq. It is again easy to show that the
constraint will be binding in equilibrium.
The next step is to di⁄erentiate (??) with respect to m to get








+ (1 ￿ ￿)A￿=w
where we have used @q=@m = 1=p since the buyer￿ s constraint is binding. Similarly,
Vk(m;k) = ￿￿ck(q;k) + A(r + 1 ￿ ￿)=w:
Inserting Vm and Vk into the ￿rst-order conditions in (1) and rearranging yields the analogs














0(x+1)[FK(K+1;H+1) + 1 ￿ ￿] ￿ ￿￿ck(q+1;K+1) (22)
The other equilibrium conditions are the same, and we repeat them here for convenience:
A = U
0(x)FH(K;H) (23)
x + K+1 = F(K;H) + (1 ￿ ￿)K: (24)
Monetary equilibrium is now de￿ned by (positive, bounded) paths for (q;x;K+1;H) satis-
fying (21)-(24) given the initial K0. The di⁄erence between the bargaining and competitive
pricing models is in the di⁄erence between (13)-(14) and (21)-(22). They di⁄er because
g(q;K) 6= cq(q;K)q and gq(q;K) 6= cq(q;K) in the ￿rst pair of equations and because
￿(q;K) 6= ck(q;K) in the second pair. Suppose we concentrate for now on steady states.17




















￿ + ￿ = FK(K;H) ￿ ￿￿(q+1;K+1): (28)
Competitive pricing signi￿cantly alters the model: (25) and (27) are the same i⁄ ￿ = 1;
and (26) and (28) are the same i⁄￿ = 0. In this way, competitive pricing is able to eradicate
the holdup problem in both the money demand and investment decisions. The idea is that in
16In this model it is easy to verify the second order conditions must hold; the di⁄erence is that now pricing
is linear so we do not need any conditions on third derivatives the way we do in the bargaining model with
￿ < 1.
17In steady state the di⁄erence between g(q;K) and cq(q;K)q across the two models is irrelevant. This is
not so out of steady state. For example, even if ￿ = 1, so that g(q;K) = c(q;K), (13) and (21) di⁄er as long
as c(q;K) 6= cq(q;K)q ￿i.e. as long as c is nolinear in q.
17the competitive model agents take the price as given; their individual choices have no e⁄ect
on the terms of trade. Since both holdup problems are eliminated under Walrasian pricing,
the only distortion remaining is the dynamic wedge associated with discounting, and under
the Friedman rule i = 0 we get the ￿rst best.
Comparing (9) with (22), the investment decision is not distorted in the competitive
monetary equilibrium except to the extent that q is wrong. The ￿rst order condition for
q in (8) says that the e¢ cient solution is q = q￿(k). From (21), for this to be true in the







in particular, in a steady state we require the Friedman rule. Hence, the steady state of
the competitive monetary equilibrium achieves the ￿rst best outcome at i = 0: the value
of money is given by q = q￿(k), and then investment, employment and consumption are all
e¢ cient. By comparison, in the bargaining model, even at i = 0, q was too low due to the
holdup problem in money demand that occurs whenever ￿ < 1, and k is too low due to the
holdup problem in investment that occurs whenever ￿ > 0.
To close this section, we mention that even though the above equations determine the ag-
gregate variables (q;x;H;K+1), the individual values of these variables di⁄ers across agents.
First, only a measure ￿ of the population consume q and have m = 0 when they enter the
night market. A group also of measure ￿ are sellers each period and enter the night market
with m = 2M, while a group of measure 1￿2￿ did not trade and enter with m = M. These
agents all choose the same x, k0 and m0, but supply di⁄erent amounts of labor,
h =
8
> > > <
> > > :
H +
A￿
w M for buyers
H ￿
A￿
w M for sellers
H otherwise
(29)
where H is aggregate hours.
2.3 Example
To obtain more insight on how in￿ ation a⁄ects the steady state of the economy, we construct
an example using explicit functional forms. Analysis of the general model is contained in
18the appendix. For ease of presentation, we focus on the competitive pricing equilibrium.
Consider the following functional forms:18
F(K;H) = K
￿H





0 < ￿ < 1
c(q;K) = q
’K
1￿’ ’ > 1:
Let | = K=H denote the capital-labor ratio. Then equations (19), (20), (25) and (26) can









with K > 0,
@K
@|



































Equation (33) determines the solution for | which can then be used to determine the
steady state values of x;q;K and H: It is straightforward to show that for ￿ ￿ ￿ N(|) is
a monotonically decreasing function in | that approaches in￿nity as | ! 0 and approaches
zero as | ! +1. Thus, a unique equilibrium value of | exists. For ￿ = 0; we obtain the
non-stochastic steady state corresponding to Hansen￿ s (1985) RBC model. With ￿ > 0;
capital creates additional value in production during the day market which leads agents to
accumulate more capital on the margin. An increase in the money growth rate decreases
N(|) for any given value of |: Consequently, greater money growth raises i and reduces
the steady state value of | which in turn lowers x;K; and q: Furthermore, from (31), H =
18The cost function below is obtained when ￿(e) = e and q = e￿k1￿￿ where 0 < ￿ < 1: As a result,
’ = 1=￿ > 1:
19(1 ￿ ￿)=[A(1 ￿ ￿|1￿￿)] which is increasing in |. So agents also work less in the night market
when money growth is higher.19
The intuition for these results is the following. An increase in in￿ ation lowers the value
of money and the quantity of goods traded in the day market. Since production is lower,
the marginal value of capital in the day market falls and so agents accumulate less capital in
the night market. The reduction in capital reduces the real wage and so agents work less in
the night market. Since the planner￿ s problem is replicated only under the Friedman rule,
i = 0; then any i > 0 is clearly welfare reducing.
3 Alternative Speci￿cations
3.1 Two Capital Goods
So far, the same stock of physical capital k was an input to both day and night production.
However, it would also seem reasonable to assume that di⁄erent types of capital are needed
to produce each good. In this section we modify the baseline model to allow for two types of
capital: k is used to produce goods at night and a new type of capital z is used to produce
day goods. Production of both capital stocks requires an investment at night; k and z are
both traded solely in the night market and are not mobile. The two capital stocks can also
depreciate at di⁄erent rates, ￿ for k and ! for z.
The problem in the night market is now
W(m;k;z) = max
x;h;m+1;k+1;z+1
U(x) ￿ Ah + ￿V (m+1;k+1;z+1)
s:t: x = ￿(m ￿ m+1 + ￿M) + wh + rk + (1 ￿ !)z + (1 ￿ ￿)k ￿ k+1 ￿ z+1:










(x + ￿m+1 + k+1 + z+1) + ￿V (m+1;k+1;z+1):
19For ￿ > ￿; N(|) can be U-shaped implying that multiple equilibria may exist.































As with k, (34) shows that agents take the same amount of z out of the night market.
Hence the distribution of (m;k;z) will be degenerate in equilibrium. In the day market,
everything is as before except we replace c(q;k) with c(q;z). The bargaining solution is still




￿c(q;zs)u0(q) + (1 ￿ ￿)u(q)cq(q;zs)
￿u0(q) + (1 ￿ ￿)cq(q;zs)
:
As before it can be shown that buyers spend all of their money balances so that d = m:
The value function in the day market is the same as before except there is an extra state

















(1 ￿ !) ￿ ￿￿(q;z)
where ￿(q;z) =
cq(q;z)gz(q;z)￿cz(q;z)gq(q;z)
gq(q;z) < 0: Again, if ￿ = 1 then ￿(q;z) = 0, and if ￿ = 0,
￿(q;z) = ￿cz(q;z):




























x + K+1 + Z+1 = F(K;H) + (1 ￿ ￿)K + (1 ￿ !)Z (40)
Equation (36) is equivalent to (13) with Z replacing K: Equation (37) is the standard equi-
librium condition for k+1 in the one-sector growth model. Equation (38) is the equilibrium
condition for z+1.












￿ + ￿ = FK(K;H) (43)
A = U
0(x)FH(K;H) (44)
x = F(K;H) ￿ ￿K ￿ !Z (45)
This model also does not display the dichotomy in Aruoba-Wright, even though k has no
direct e⁄ect on q production. Since investment in z is done in the night market, it has to be
￿nanced by changes in x, h or k+1.20
For ￿ = 1, gq(q;z) = cq(q;z) and ￿(q;z) = 0. Then from (41) we see that the Friedman
rule generates the e¢ cient quantity, conditional on z; q￿ = q￿(z). However, when ￿ = 1;
z = 0. The reason is that z only has value in q production, and when ￿ = 0 sellers get no
surplus from selling q. Since z is costly, agents do not accumulate any. This is an extreme
outcome of the holdup problem; if z is a necessary input for q production, then for ￿ = 0
the holdup problem causes q production and the monetary equilibrium to collapse.
20However, when z does not depreciate, ! = 0, the model is recursive since k, h and x are determined by
(43), (44) and (45) independently of q and z. Changes in k, h and x will a⁄ect q and z but not vice-versa.
Since monetary policy changes q; this will change the steady state level of z but will have no e⁄ect on k;h;
and x in the night market. In this sense, when ! = 0 the dichotomy reappears.
22With Walrasian pricing, once again the holdup problems on money and capital are elim-












As with bargaining, the dichotomy is broken. Consequently, changes in the money growth
rate will a⁄ect the choice of z which a⁄ects x, h and k+1. Intuitively, we expect that an
increases in the money growth rate ￿ raise i, which lowers q thereby reducing the incentive
to invest in z.
3.2 Example
Again, we use explicit functional forms to gain insight as to how monetary policy a⁄ects the
economy. We use the same functional forms as before except that Z now replaces K in the
cost function. For presentation purposes we look at the equilibrium with Walrasian pricing.























implying that the capital-labor ratio is uniquely pinned down which in turn determines the



















’+￿￿1 < 1 as before: So Z is pinned down. Finally, (45) yields
H = ￿
(


















23How does policy a⁄ect this economy? An increase in the money growth rate above the
Friedman rule increases the nominal interest rate. An increase in i again lowers the value of
money and thus the quantity of goods produced in the day market. As before, this reduces
the marginal value of a unit of Z so there is less investment. Since agents need fewer resources
for investment, they work less in the night market and so there is less K. Aggregate output
in the night market falls however, the capital-labor ratio is una⁄ected which leaves the real
wage and consumption unchanged. Since aggregate output falls but consumption stays the
same, the saving rate declines.
3.3 Capital Produced in the Day
In the previous models, all investment occurred at night, and so money is not needed to pay
for capital goods. It is known that in reduced form models it makes a di⁄erence if one has to
pay for capital goods with cash; e.g. Stockman (1981). To consider this e⁄ect in our model,
we modify things by assuming that investment occurs in the day market where agents are
anonymous and therefore money is essential for trade. Suppose that agents do not consume
the output of the day market at all but instead use it as an intermediate input that can
be transformed into capital k for production at night, where without loss of generality we
assume q can be transformed one for one into k.21 As in the previous sections, a fraction ￿
have the ability to produce the intermediate input, and the same fraction have the ability to
transform it into capital, but no agent can do both. Once capital is produced it is immobile,
as in the other models, and so it cannot serve as a medium of exchange.
Capital is productive in the night market, where it will be rented to competitive ￿rms,
but not the day market ￿i.e. c(q;k) = c(q). Since trade is anonymous, money is needed to
buy capital, as in Stockman￿ s model. The night market problem is
W(m;k) = max
x;h;m+1
U(x) ￿ Ah + ￿V (m+1;k)
st x = wh + (r + 1 ￿ ￿)k + ￿(m + ￿M ￿ m+1):
21See Shi (1999) for a related model.






[x ￿ (r + 1 ￿ ￿)k ￿ ￿(m + ￿M ￿ m+1)] + ￿V (m+1;k):










Note that since individual k is obtained in the day market in this model, individual capital
holdings depend on the random shocks. Hence, there is a distribution of k across agents.
Since the ￿rst-order condition for m+1 is not independent of one￿ s capital holdings it is not
obvious at this stage if the distribution of money holdings is degenerate. We demonstrate
below that it is. The envelope conditions are still given by (2) and (3).
One can assume agents bargain just as in the earlier model, but the surpluses are di⁄erent.
The buyer gives up d units of money and acquires q units of intermediate goods which is
transformed into k = d units of capital. Hence his surplus is Sb = W(m￿d;k+q)￿W(m;k) =
q(r + 1 ￿ ￿)A=w ￿ ￿dA=w. Similarly, the seller￿ s surplus is Ss = ￿c(q) + W(m + d;k) ￿
W(m;k) = ￿c(q) + ￿dA=w. Notice these surpluses and hence (q;d) are independent of the
individuals￿capital holdings and the seller￿ s money holdings. Again one can show d = mb.
Then the ￿rst-order condition for q can be written
mb￿ = g(q;r;w) =
￿c(q) + (1 ￿ ￿)qc0(q)
￿(r + 1 ￿ ￿)A=w + (1 ￿ ￿)c0(q)
(r + 1 ￿ ￿)
and @q=@mb = ￿=gq(q;r;w).
The value function in the day market is now
V (m;k) = ￿
Z n



















dF(~ m) + W(m;k)
where F(~ m) is the distribution of money holdings across agents and ~ d(~ m) is the money
received by a randomly encountered buyer holding ~ m units of money. The integration is
25only with regards to ~ m since capital holdings are irrelevant for the payo⁄s in bargaining.
The envelope condition is
Vm(m;k) = ￿
Z ￿
































1 ￿ ￿ + ￿




Since Vm(m;k) is independent of the buyer￿ s capital holdings, then it must be the case that
the choice of money taken out of the night market according to (48) is the same for everyone
￿the distribution of m is again degenerate regardless of whether or not the distribution of
capital is degenerate.







1 ￿ ￿ + ￿




It is apparent that this model does not dichotomize ￿we cannnot solve for q without knowing





FK(K;H) + 1 ￿ ￿
gq [q;FK(K;H);FH(K;H)]
:
If we set ￿ = 1 then g(q;r;w) = c(q)w=A, and gq(q;r;w) = c0(q)w=A = c0(q)FH(K;H)=A,





FK(K;H) + 1 ￿ ￿
c0(q)FH(K;H)
:










0 [F(K;H) + (1 ￿ ￿)K]FH(K;H): (51)
Using (50) and (51), it is straightforward to show that @K=@i < 0. The intuition behind
this result is that an increase in the money growth rate lowers the value of money acquired
by sellers of intermediate goods and so they produce less. Since intermediate goods are used
26to produce capital, it follows immediately that aggregate K is lower. Thus, we get a similar
result to Stockman but for a di⁄erent reason.
What if agents were allowed to trade k in the night market? Notice that it is merely a
secondary market ￿no investment occurs, only reallocation of k. Let ￿ denote the price of






[x + ￿k+1 ￿ ￿(r + 1 ￿ ￿)k ￿ ￿(m + ￿M ￿ m+1)]+￿V (m+1;k+1):




Since wealth is linear in capital holdings and capital does not a⁄ect the value of intermediate
good trades, Vk(m+1;k+1) = Wk(m+1;k+1) = A






￿+1 (r+1 + 1 ￿ ￿)
This expression is independent of individual k and merely pins down the path for the price
of capital in the secondary market such that no arbitrage opportunities exist. Agents are
indi⁄erent between buying or selling capital at this price and so the distribution of capital
is not pinned down without further assumptions on agents￿behavior.
With competitive pricing, buyers choose how much of the intermediate good to purchase.
As before, d = m so buyers spend all of their money and acquire qb = m=p units of goods.
Sellers set marginal cost equal to the value of a marginal unit of money received in payment,
c0(qs) = A
w￿p: In equilibrium, qb = qs = q which solves c0(q) =
A￿m
wq : Following the same








1 ￿ ￿ + ￿A











1 ￿ ￿ + ￿A




Comparing (49) and (52) note that the dynamics of the model under bargaining and Wal-






FK(K;H) + 1 ￿ ￿
c0(q)FH(K;H)
27which is the same steady-state expression that arises under bargaining when ￿ = 1. So an
equilibrium with Walrasian pricing is a pair (K;H) solving (50) and (51). Once again, there
is no dichotomy and excessive money growth, creates in￿ ation, raises the nominal interest






In this paper we have taken another step towards closing the gap between search models of
money and standard macro models. We have shown how deriving the demand for money
from ￿rst principles can be incorporated in the neoclassical growth model and how monetary
policy a⁄ects aggregate output, employment and consumption. The key point of our paper is
that there are many links by which changes in the value of money in the search market spill
over to a⁄ect real variables in markets that do not require the use of money for exchange.
28Appendix A
Here we consider the model with utility nonseparable in (x;q;e), but still linear in h, say
^ U(x;q;e)￿Ah. Since q and e are determined during the day, they are state variables in the
night market. For this section we assume that capital is not used for production during the
day so q = f(e): so we let W(m;k;q;e) now denote the value function at night,
W(m;k;q;e) = max
x;h;m+1;k+1
^ U(x;q;e) ￿ Ah + ￿V (m+1;k+1)
s:t: x = rk + wh + ￿(m + ￿M ￿ m+1) + (1 ￿ ￿)k ￿ k+1:











(x + ￿m+1 + k+1) + ￿V (m+1;k+1)
￿
:
The ￿rst-order conditions are given by:











￿ = ￿Vm(m+1;k+1) (56)
Hence we again have a degenerate distribution of (m;k). More importantly for this section,
the choice of x in the night market is a⁄ected by how much the agent consumed or produced








(r + 1 ￿ ￿) (58)
Wq(m;k;q;e) = ^ Uq(x;q;e) (59)
We(m;k;q;e) = ^ Ue(x;q;e): (60)
Suppose that during the day agents meet and bargain bilaterally. The bargaining problem
is maxS￿
bS1￿￿
s subject to q = f(e) and d ￿ m, where now we have
Sb = W(mb ￿ d;kb;q;0) ￿ W(mb;kb;0;0)
Ss = W(ms + d;ks;0;e) ￿ W(ms;ks;0;0)
29By the usual logic, one can show d = mb. Using this and e =  (q) = f￿1(q), the ￿rst order
condition with respect to q can be written
￿Ss ^ Uq(xb;q;0) + (1 ￿ ￿)Sb ^ Ue [xs;0; (q)] 
0(q) = 0: (61)
Agents generally choose di⁄erent values of x in the night market. Letting xs, xb, and x0 be
the quantities purchased by day market sellers, buyers and non-traders, we have
Sb = ^ U(xb;q;0) ￿ ^ U(x0;0;0) ￿
A
w
(xb ￿ x0 + ￿mb)
Ss = ^ U [xs;0; (q)] ￿ ^ U(x0;0;0) ￿
A
w
(xs ￿ x0 ￿ ￿mb):
>From the FOC for x,














, xb = xb(q; A
w) and x0 = x0(A
w).






























































































































































The key observation here is that A=w enters g. If U = U(x) + u(q) ￿ ￿(e) ￿ Ah is
separable, then g(q; A
w) = g(q) reduces to the model in the text with no capital used in the
30day market ￿that is, to a model that dichotomizes. Also, for any U, if ￿ = 1 then the






























































w from the ￿rst order condition for x: If U = U(x;q) ￿






w), and this becomes
A
w
￿m = ￿[ (q)] = c(q):
The value function in the day market is given by
V (m;k) = ￿W(m;k;q;0) + ￿W [m;k;0; (~ q)] + (1 ￿ 2￿)W(m;k;0;0) (62)





































It is clear from this expression that q cannot be determined independently of w which in



















￿ + ￿ = FK(K;H)
x = F(K;H) ￿ ￿K
H =
x ￿ [FK(K;H) ￿ ￿]K
FH(K;H)
and




























































with hs;hb;h0 denoting the hours worked in the night market by day market sellers, buyers
and non-traders respectively. It is clear from this equation that unless q disappears from x
when aggregating over xb;xs and x0, the dichotomy is broken and changes in i a⁄ect x, H
and K. So monetary policy a⁄ects q and e and this spillsover to a⁄ect consumption, hours

















































which is the e¢ ciency condition for producing q in the day market.




s:t: pqb ￿ mb
where p is the money price of goods. The seller￿ s problem is
max
qs
W [ms + pqs;ks;0; (qs)]
The seller￿ s ￿rst-order condition is





p = ￿Ue [xs;0; (qs)] 
0(qs)































































Equation (64 is equal to the bargaining steady state under bargaining with ￿ = 1, (63).
33Appendix B
Baseline Model
Assume constant returns to scale production function for general goods. So
F(K;H)
H
= F(K=H;1) = F(|)
where | = K=H: In the steady state of the baseline model with Walrasian pricing we have














x = H [F(|) ￿ ￿|]; (68)









































































































) q = q(|;i)
Finally, we can rewrite (66) as













A ￿ N(|) (72)































The ￿rst term is negative. The second term is positive if FHK(|) is positive. The third term
is ambiguous. Thus without further restrictions on the properties of the cost function, it is
not possible to say anything about existence or uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Two types of capital
For this model with Walrasian pricing, replace c(q;K) with c(q;Z) where Z is special








￿ + ￿ = FK(|) (74)






x = H [F(|) ￿ ￿|] ￿ !Z (77)
35>From (74), the steady state value of | is given by
| = F
￿1
K (￿ + ￿) (78)






















) q = q(Z;i); with qz(Z;i) > 0 and qi(Z;i) < 0
where q is unique given Z: Consequently, (75) becomes







K (￿ + ￿)
￿
cz [q(Z;i);Z] (80)


























K (￿ + ￿)
￿ (81)
Thus, if a solution to (80) exists, then q;x;K; and H are all uniquely determined.
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